Willard-v-Tayloe
The movement claim that Willard v. Tayloe, 75 U.S. 557 (1869), establishes federal paper-currency authority as limited to the District of Columbia is unsupported
The movement reads Willard v. Tayloe (1869) for the proposition that federal paper-currency authority is limited to the District of Columbia. The actual decision is a contract case about specific performance and the medium of payment — it does not address congressional currency power as a geographic question at all.
When There is No Money: The Monetary Foundation Examined
Beers's first treatise argues that paper currency cannot constitute 'money' because money requires intrinsic substance. The constitutional argument is foreclosed by the Legal Tender Cases (Knox v. Lee, Juilliard v. Greenman). The functional argument — that modern fiat currency operates more like debt than like money — has economic substance the Constitution does not engage. Two questions, two different answers.
When There is No Money
Treatise #1 of Beers's 11-treatise corpus. Argues that Federal Reserve Notes are an unredeemable debt instrument backed by citizen labor, making the people creditors of the system rather than debtors. The structural argument depends on a chain of 19th-century Supreme Court cases — Willard v. Tayloe, Hepburn v. Griswold, Knox v. Lee, Canter — and 20th-century evidence like the Patman 1933 Congressional Record entry. Direct primary-source verification finds the chain does not hold: Willard does not say what Beers attributes to it; Hepburn was overruled by Knox; Knox itself upheld paper-currency authority on the merits; and Patman's 'mortgage on all the homes' line was spoken in *support* of fiat-backed currency expansion, not against it.