Swift-v-Tyson
The movement claim that Swift v. Tyson establishes the Constitution as 'predicated upon the common law' and federal courts as applying common law as the foundational basis of federal jurisprudence is unsupported
Swift v. Tyson (1842) once let federal courts apply general federal common law in diversity cases. Erie Railroad v. Tompkins (1938) overruled it explicitly. The movement still cites Swift for the proposition that the Constitution is 'predicated upon the common law,' and treats Swift as live authority. It isn't — it was overruled the better part of a century ago.
Liberty: Treatise #2's Definitional Framework Examined
Beers's second treatise builds a definitional framework around 'consent,' the 'person/man' distinction, and 'liberty' that produces real doctrinal observations alongside real overreach. The definitional moves are partially supported by Supreme Court vocabulary on liberty and statutory construction; the framework as a whole collapses operative law into rhetorical categories that don't survive primary-source verification.
Liberty
Treatise #2 of Beers's 11-treatise corpus. The corpus's definitional and philosophical engine room — liberty as divinely mandated, 'person' as artificial civil-law construct distinct from 'man,' common law as biblical foundation, the Declaration of Independence as super-constitutional standard, and the knowing-voluntary-intentional consent standard for legal obligations. The consent standard is identified by the treatise's own dependency map as the most load-bearing axiom in the entire corpus. Per-treatise verification surfaced five principal contradictions in the citation cascade: Nebbia liberty language is McReynolds dissent (not Roberts majority); Swift v. Tyson is counsel argument AND was overruled by Erie (1938); Pembina defines 'citizens' for Article IV P&I purposes (not 'natural persons' as allegiance-status); Jacobson supports state power (not limits on it); In re Booth was reversed by Ableman v. Booth (1859).