Swift-v-Tyson
The movement claim that Glass v. Sloop Betsey and Hepburn v. Ellzey support Beers's framework via 'founded upon compact' and 'two types of states' propositions is unsupported, because the cited passages appear to be counsel argument rather than the Court's binding opinion
Byron Beers's Treatise #3 cites two early-Republic Supreme Court cases — Glass v. Sloop Betsey, 3 Dall. 6 (1794), and Hepburn v. Ellzey, 6 U.S. 445 (1804) — for propositions ('our government is founded upon compact... sovereignty was, and is, in the people'; 'two types of states' defined by Cicero and Burlamaqui) that are widely circulated with these citations but that appear, on examination, to be from counsel's argument preserved in the official reports rather than from the Court's binding opinions. Chief Justice Jay's Glass opinion is famously terse (about one paragraph) and concerns French consular admiralty jurisdiction; the 'founded upon compact' passage is from oral argument or counsel records. Chief Justice Marshall's Hepburn opinion is a one-issue jurisdiction holding (D.C. residents are not Article III 'state' citizens); the Cicero/Burlamaqui contrast appears in counsel's briefs at pp. 446-51, not in Marshall's opinion. Counsel argument has no precedential weight. The pattern recurs across the Beers corpus and matches Swift v. Tyson from the Treatise 1 cycle (where the 'predicated upon the common law' phrase was counsel argument cited as if holding). A finding here documents the pattern as methodological observation.
The movement claim that Swift v. Tyson establishes the Constitution as 'predicated upon the common law' and federal courts as applying common law as the foundational basis of federal jurisprudence is unsupported
Swift v. Tyson (1842) once let federal courts apply general federal common law in diversity cases. Erie Railroad v. Tompkins (1938) overruled it explicitly. The movement still cites Swift for the proposition that the Constitution is 'predicated upon the common law,' and treats Swift as live authority. It isn't — it was overruled the better part of a century ago.
Liberty: Treatise #2's Definitional Framework Examined
Beers's second treatise builds a definitional framework around 'consent,' the 'person/man' distinction, and 'liberty' that produces real doctrinal observations alongside real overreach. The definitional moves are partially supported by Supreme Court vocabulary on liberty and statutory construction; the framework as a whole collapses operative law into rhetorical categories that don't survive primary-source verification.
Liberty
Treatise #2 of Beers's 11-treatise corpus. The corpus's definitional and philosophical engine room — liberty as divinely mandated, 'person' as artificial civil-law construct distinct from 'man,' common law as biblical foundation, the Declaration of Independence as super-constitutional standard, and the knowing-voluntary-intentional consent standard for legal obligations. The consent standard is identified by the treatise's own dependency map as the most load-bearing axiom in the entire corpus. Per-treatise verification surfaced five principal contradictions in the citation cascade: Nebbia liberty language is McReynolds dissent (not Roberts majority); Swift v. Tyson is counsel argument AND was overruled by Erie (1938); Pembina defines 'citizens' for Article IV P&I purposes (not 'natural persons' as allegiance-status); Jacobson supports state power (not limits on it); In re Booth was reversed by Ableman v. Booth (1859).