Statutory-Interpretation
The Federal Zone Thesis at Its Foundation
Paul Andrew Mitchell's *The Federal Zone* (1992; 11th ed. 2001) builds an elaborate territorial-limits argument on three foundational moves: a re-reading of the Supreme Court's 'three meanings' of 'United States' from Hooven & Allison, a restrictive reading of the IRC's definition of 'State,' and a restrictive reading of the IRC's use of 'includes.' The structural argument depends on each foundation holding. None of the three holds against primary sources. § 7701(c) — the IRC's own construction rule — directly forecloses the central move.
'Includes' in the Internal Revenue Code
26 U.S.C. § 7701(c) is the IRC's own rule for how the words 'includes' and 'including' should be read in IRC definitions. The rule says the listed items do not exclude other things within the ordinary meaning of the defined term. This single sentence forecloses the restrictive-includes reading on which a substantial part of alternate-tax theory depends.
The Three Meanings of 'United States'
The Supreme Court in Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt (1945) recognized that the term 'United States' can carry one of three distinct senses. The observation is real and analytically useful — but it is regularly misread in alternate-tax theory as authority that the term means only the federal territory in tax statutes. The case says nothing of the kind.
Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius
A common-law canon of statutory construction: 'the express mention of one thing excludes others.' The canon raises a defeasible presumption that items not listed in a statute are excluded from its reach. It is genuinely ancient, genuinely operative in U.S. statutory interpretation, and frequently invoked in alternate-tax theory — most often without acknowledging the canon's well-mapped limits or the express statutory overrides that Congress regularly enacts.