Social-Contract
The movement claim that valid legal obligations to the federal or state government require knowing, voluntary, and intentional individualized consent — and that constructive, tacit, or democratic-process-mediated consent cannot bind a non-consenting individual — is foreclosed
The movement standard — that valid government obligations require individualized, knowing, written consent or no jurisdiction attaches — has no basis in any source of American law. Constructive consent doctrines (driving, mailing, residing, transacting) are how operative law actually works. The movement standard is doctrinally adjacent to adhesion-contract scholarship, which the finding engages on its own terms.
Knowing, Voluntary, Intentional Consent (Beers)
Beers's consent standard: valid government obligations require individualized, knowing, voluntary, intentional, written consent — anything less is constructive consent without real assent. The vocabulary is doctrinally adjacent to adhesion-contract scholarship (Kessler, Rakoff, Radin) but operative law treats constructive consent as sufficient. Defined here as the term of art the project's findings engage.