Pembina
The movement claim that Pembina v. Pennsylvania defines 'natural person' as 'a member of the body politic owing allegiance to the State' — establishing personhood as a status of subjection — is unsupported
The movement reads Pembina v. Pennsylvania for the proposition that 'natural person' means a subject of the state owing allegiance. The actual decision is about diversity jurisdiction over corporations. But the underlying observation — that corporations themselves carry a form of statutory citizenship under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) — is real, and the finding preserves it rather than dismissing the layered structure.
Liberty: Treatise #2's Definitional Framework Examined
Beers's second treatise builds a definitional framework around 'consent,' the 'person/man' distinction, and 'liberty' that produces real doctrinal observations alongside real overreach. The definitional moves are partially supported by Supreme Court vocabulary on liberty and statutory construction; the framework as a whole collapses operative law into rhetorical categories that don't survive primary-source verification.
Liberty
Treatise #2 of Beers's 11-treatise corpus. The corpus's definitional and philosophical engine room — liberty as divinely mandated, 'person' as artificial civil-law construct distinct from 'man,' common law as biblical foundation, the Declaration of Independence as super-constitutional standard, and the knowing-voluntary-intentional consent standard for legal obligations. The consent standard is identified by the treatise's own dependency map as the most load-bearing axiom in the entire corpus. Per-treatise verification surfaced five principal contradictions in the citation cascade: Nebbia liberty language is McReynolds dissent (not Roberts majority); Swift v. Tyson is counsel argument AND was overruled by Erie (1938); Pembina defines 'citizens' for Article IV P&I purposes (not 'natural persons' as allegiance-status); Jacobson supports state power (not limits on it); In re Booth was reversed by Ableman v. Booth (1859).