Nemo-Dat
The movement claim that the Declaration of Independence functions as super-constitutional law that overrides statutes and constitutional provisions where they conflict is unsupported
The Declaration is foundational political philosophy, not enforceable law that overrides statutes or constitutional provisions. But the natural-law constitutional tradition (Arkes, Jaffa, Sandefur, Barnett) treats the deeper question — whether constitutional interpretation may draw on Declaration principles — seriously, and the question is not foreclosed at the scholarly level. Engaged in good faith rather than dismissed.
Liberty
Treatise #2 of Beers's 11-treatise corpus. The corpus's definitional and philosophical engine room — liberty as divinely mandated, 'person' as artificial civil-law construct distinct from 'man,' common law as biblical foundation, the Declaration of Independence as super-constitutional standard, and the knowing-voluntary-intentional consent standard for legal obligations. The consent standard is identified by the treatise's own dependency map as the most load-bearing axiom in the entire corpus. Per-treatise verification surfaced five principal contradictions in the citation cascade: Nebbia liberty language is McReynolds dissent (not Roberts majority); Swift v. Tyson is counsel argument AND was overruled by Erie (1938); Pembina defines 'citizens' for Article IV P&I purposes (not 'natural persons' as allegiance-status); Jacobson supports state power (not limits on it); In re Booth was reversed by Ableman v. Booth (1859).