Hepburn-v-Ellzey
The movement claim that Glass v. Sloop Betsey and Hepburn v. Ellzey support Beers's framework via 'founded upon compact' and 'two types of states' propositions is unsupported, because the cited passages appear to be counsel argument rather than the Court's binding opinion
Byron Beers's Treatise #3 cites two early-Republic Supreme Court cases — Glass v. Sloop Betsey, 3 Dall. 6 (1794), and Hepburn v. Ellzey, 6 U.S. 445 (1804) — for propositions ('our government is founded upon compact... sovereignty was, and is, in the people'; 'two types of states' defined by Cicero and Burlamaqui) that are widely circulated with these citations but that appear, on examination, to be from counsel's argument preserved in the official reports rather than from the Court's binding opinions. Chief Justice Jay's Glass opinion is famously terse (about one paragraph) and concerns French consular admiralty jurisdiction; the 'founded upon compact' passage is from oral argument or counsel records. Chief Justice Marshall's Hepburn opinion is a one-issue jurisdiction holding (D.C. residents are not Article III 'state' citizens); the Cicero/Burlamaqui contrast appears in counsel's briefs at pp. 446-51, not in Marshall's opinion. Counsel argument has no precedential weight. The pattern recurs across the Beers corpus and matches Swift v. Tyson from the Treatise 1 cycle (where the 'predicated upon the common law' phrase was counsel argument cited as if holding). A finding here documents the pattern as methodological observation.
The Natural Order of Things: Treatise #3 as Architectural Synthesis
Treatise #3 is the architectural treatise — establishes the natural-order / unnatural-order binary that organizes the Beers corpus. Real cases, real scholars, real doctrinal seeds. The load-bearing finding: U.S. v. Amy's toga-civillis quote is real, but in Taney's hands the same reasoning UPHELD the criminal conviction of an enslaved woman. The quote does opposite work depending on which direction the personhood line runs. Three additional findings document the rhetorical-premise-vs-operative-holding pattern (Cruikshank, Hurtado, the counsel-argument-as-holding line in Glass and Hepburn).