Florida-Administrative-Procedure-Act

Movement claim: Florida Statutes § 120.5(1)(a) acknowledges that administrative agency power is 'extra-constitutional' sovereign authority — the cite is wrong (correct citation is § 120.52(1)(a)), the language exists, and the operative meaning is mundane Florida administrative-procedure-act scoping, not parallel sovereignty

Byron Beers's Treatise #4 cites Florida Statutes § 120.5(1)(a) for the proposition that 'agency' is defined as the Governor's exercise of powers 'other than those derived from the constitution' — read as the state legislature's own statutory acknowledgment that administrative agency power is explicitly extra-constitutional sovereign authority, operating in a different legal universe from constitutional governance. The reading is doubly wrong. (1) The cite is wrong on its face — current Florida law is at § 120.52(1)(a), not § 120.5(1)(a). The Florida Administrative Procedure Act's definitional section was renumbered to § 120.52 in modern recodifications. (2) The substantive language exists in the statute — the Governor is listed as the first 'agency' for APA purposes 'if acting pursuant to powers other than those derived from the constitution.' But the operative meaning is mundane: the APA's procedural requirements (notice-and-comment rulemaking, formal hearings, judicial review) apply only when the Governor acts in a statutory administrative capacity. They do not apply when he exercises core executive constitutional functions (pardons, veto, line-item authority). Standard separation-of-administrative-from-executive distinction; routine in American APA jurisprudence; does not establish a parallel 'constitutional sovereign' legal regime operating outside statutory law. The movement reads narrow APA scoping language as cosmic doctrine.