Expressio-Unius
'Includes' as non-exclusive: Helvering v. Morgan's settled the question at apex in 1934
The construction rule for 'includes' and 'including' in tax statutes was substantively decided by the Supreme Court in 1934 — at apex, on the merits, citing the Revenue Act's own internal construction rule. The 1934 holding is the apex anchor for what 26 U.S.C. § 7701(c) now codifies. Subsequent re-raisings of the question (the Federal-Zone-style tax-protester line) are routed to lower courts that apply this binding precedent rather than re-examine it.
The Federal Zone Thesis at Its Foundation
Paul Andrew Mitchell's *The Federal Zone* (1992; 11th ed. 2001) builds an elaborate territorial-limits argument on three foundational moves: a re-reading of the Supreme Court's 'three meanings' of 'United States' from Hooven & Allison, a restrictive reading of the IRC's definition of 'State,' and a restrictive reading of the IRC's use of 'includes.' The structural argument depends on each foundation holding. None of the three holds against primary sources. § 7701(c) — the IRC's own construction rule — directly forecloses the central move.
Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius
A common-law canon of statutory construction: 'the express mention of one thing excludes others.' The canon raises a defeasible presumption that items not listed in a statute are excluded from its reach. It is genuinely ancient, genuinely operative in U.S. statutory interpretation, and frequently invoked in alternate-tax theory — most often without acknowledging the canon's well-mapped limits or the express statutory overrides that Congress regularly enacts.